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Defence Policy Statement: Implications for the Canadian Navy

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Defence Policy Statement: Defence Policy Statement: Implications for the Canadian Navy

By Dr. Richard Gimblett - May 2005

As reported in "COMMENTARY", by the ROYAL CANADIAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

Dr Richard Gimblett served for 27 years in the Canadian Navy prior to becoming an independent historian and defence policy analyst. His service included ships of various classes on both coasts, notably as Combat Officer of HMCS Protecteur for operations in the Persian Gulf during the war of 1991. He subsequently co-authored the official account of that conflict, under the title Operation FRICTION: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 (Dundurn, 1997). His last appointment was to the Directorate of Maritime Strategy, as lead writer of Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 (DND, 2001). He is a Research Fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University and is on the Visiting Faculty of the Canadian Forces College. His newest book is Operation Apoll The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism (Magic Light, 2004).

Initial reaction to the Canadian Defence Policy Statement (DPS) has been that it is essentially a "pro-Army" document, and as such "bad" for the other services. Analysis along those lines betrays a fundamental mis-reading of the DPS, indeed if not of the entire Canadian defence condition. The DPS proposes a radical re-organization of all of the Canadian Forces – whether that is "good" or "bad" for any one service will depend greatly upon whether or not they take it as the opportunity for long-needed fundamental reform to meet a changed security environment. From a naval perspective, the DPS is a pro-Army document only to the extent that it provides the logic for ensuring our land forces are more "effective, relevant and responsive" than they have been – and a well-balanced range of naval capabilities are critical to that process.

In its essence, the Defence Policy Statement follows the logic of the Navy's own strategic vision, Leadmark. Published in the summer of 2001, barely a month before the world supposedly "changed," Leadmark has generally (and simplistically) been interpreted as providing the outmoded rationale for an expeditionary navy able to command coalition forces on the far side of the world – precisely the role the Canadian Navy subsequently performed with great success in Operation Apollo, our two-year long contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in the war against terrorism in the Arabian Sea. A more thorough read of Leadmark, however, reveals an appreciation that control of the sea in the 21st century means the shifting of naval operations from the open oceans to the littorals (the "sea-land interface"); and a consequent theme of the document is the transformation of the Navy so that it might better contribute to influencing the course of military actions on land – an underlying theme also of the DPS.

For those infatuated with the newfound priority for Homeland Defence, a similarly careful reading of Leadmark finds Homeland Defence identified as a primary naval role – it was given scant elaboration only because prior to September 11th, few could accept that a credible threat to our homeland even existed. In truth, Leadmark did identify the evolving threat environment (specifically naming Osama bin Laden), and made the further point that, because our immediate offshore maritime areas of responsibility are so vast and encompass such demanding operating conditions, patrolling them demands an inter-connected assemblage of air, surface and sub-surface platforms, composed mostly of large robust vessels to ensure stability and long range. Any proper Canadian Navy, established even for narrow homeland defence, must by definition be oceanic in reach, and as such capable of expeditionary operations at the discretion of the government in times of lower threat at home.

More to the point, because Leadmark anticipated the current shifts in the domestic and international security environments, nothing that has transpired since September 11th changes its underlying philosophy.

Leadmark is in fact being updated, to be released very soon under the title Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark, to reflect some of our changed perceptions within the post 9/11 security environment. But the argument can be made that the broader Canadian Forces thinking has finally caught up with the transformation the Navy was experiencing through the 1990s. That is not to say these shifts do not demand some changes in the application of that philosophy, in both concept of operations and fleet structure. As proposed in the DPS, these do have profound implications for the Navy. But they are not incompatible with the continuing need for a well-balanced combat-capable fleet and a robust supporting shore infrastructure.

Indeed, existing capabilities within the Canadian Navy provide the basis to fast track the envisioned re-organization. As one example, the primary transformation initiative described in the DPS calls for the re-structuring of command and control of the CF into a "unified national Canada Command." Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier has set an ambitious objective of establishing this as a fully operational capability by 2010, in time for the Winter Olympics in Vancouver, a scenario tailor-made for the envisioned integrated naval, air, land and special forces. To examine the requirements more precisely, he proposes an experiment next year (2006) using Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) as the test-bed, a site obviously recommended by the recent expansion of the naval focus of the east coast headquarters into a multi-agency Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC) involving six Canadian departments and agencies and the US Coast Guard. Close coordination already exists with the Air Force for offshore maritime patrols; the leap to include better operational links with the nearby Gagetown army establishments is not a large one.

Looking only slightly further downstream, the proximity of Halifax dockyard to the Shearwater air base, with its long runway and rail facilities, suggests a valuable staging area for land forces to embark in what General Hillier has affectionately styled a "Big Honking Ship" – an expeditionary support ship capable of carrying up to a battalion-sized formation of 500- 1000 troops and their vehicles and fighting stores – the key point being that it is distinct from the already defined Joint Support Ship (JSS) replacement for the Navy's aging replenishment ships.

Commentators again have styled this as a radical departure for the Canadian Navy, requiring a fundamental re-structuring of the fleet, and possibly beyond its reach. Because the CF has yet to define the exact Canadian requirements of such a vessel, General Hillier's appellation will have to suffice. Crewing a "BHS" admittedly will be a challenge, but is probably achievable within plans already envisioned for the re-organization of the fleet. To begin, the choice of American or British vessels at the high end of what might be acquired are roughly the same tonnage as the light fleet aircraft carriers operated in our not-so-distant past, or the Protecteur-class replenishment ships currently in the fleet, and what has been anticipated for the Joint Support Ship (JSS) Project (respectively: USS San Antonio, 25,000 tonnes; HMS Ocean, 22,000 tonnes; HMCS Bonaventure, 16,000 tonnes; HMCS Protecteur, 24,000 tonnes; JSS statement of requirement, 28,000 tonnes). Initial indications are that a ship of this type could be acquired on a leaseto- buy basis in fairly short order, giving a real kick-start to the establishment of a Standing Contingency Task Force.

Beyond that, acquisition of a BHS does nothing to resolve a looming naval problem – replacing the command and control capability presently resident in the DDG-280 Iroquois-class destroyers. Although this too is a priority identified in the DPS, the CF capabilities requirements board has failed to identify replacement of those rapidly aging 40-year-old vessels, and once they do, complex ship replacement programs typically take 15-20 years to unfold. Migrating the C2 capability to frigates during Operation Apollo proved less than satisfactory. "Gapping" the destroyers will be a decided challenge.

That underscores the point that acquisition of a BHS does not mean the rest of the fleet can be junked as no longer necessary. While it will demand a shift of naval task group operations from open ocean sea control, operating in the littorals actually increases the dangers to fleet units. None of these are insurmountable; indeed maritime- based Combat Service Support greatly simplifies other issues of landbased force protection. But as the Navy discovered in the Arabian Sea, the submarine threat – rather than going away – has only changed form from aging Soviet nuclear attack submarines to modern French and Russian built diesel "boats" that equip a host of potentially hostile fleets; and those same nations also are proliferating deadly supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles throughout the Third World. Add to that the point that a major benefit of operating in the littorals is the ready ability to re-supply our forces from sea, and one quickly comes to the realization that acquisition of a BHS demands the maintenance of a synergistic fleet structure not unlike the present combination of destroyers, frigates, replenishment ships and submarines.

And that raises last but not least the issue of submarines. Far from providing a pretext to be rid of the unfairly-maligned Victoria-class, the DPS foresees an expanded role for precisely that type of diesel submarine, not just as part of the general force protection described above, but as essential to expanded CF special operations capabilities. The very same conditions that complicate the ASW (antisubmarine warfare) problem for surface ships in the littorals work to the advantage of the especially covert diesel submarine, and the Victorias were originally built in part to assist the British Royal Marines and Special Air Service troops in inshore operations; they will greatly expand the covert capabilities of our own Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2).

All told, the new Defence Policy Statement is anything but "a bad thing" for the Canadian Navy. Beyond providing the continuing rationale for a robust air, surface and sub-surface fleet, defence planners also will find that the maintenance of viable naval capabilities is absolutely essential to the realization of the bold new vision espoused by the DPS. For the Canadian Navy, the DPS is not a liability, but rather a further opportunity to contribute to the transformation of the Canadian Forces.

The views expressed are those of the author, and do no necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members.

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